000			01932 a2200553 4500
005			20250515113538.0
264		0	_c20080411
008			200804s 0 0 eng d
022			_a0586-5964
040			_aNLM _beng _cNLM
100	1		_aFalit, Benjamin P
245	0	0	_aCurbing industry sponsor's incentive to design post-approval trials that are suboptimal for informing prescribers but more likely than optimal designs to yield favorable results. _h[electronic resource]
260			_bSeton Hall law review _c2007
300			_a969-1049 p. _bdigital
500			_aPublication Type: Journal Article
650	0	4	_aClinical Protocols
650	0	4	_aClinical Trials, Phase IV as Topic _xeconomics
650	0	4	_aComplementary Therapies
650	0	4	_aCost-Benefit Analysis
650	0	4	_aDose-Response Relationship, Drug
650	0	4	_aDrug Approval
650	0	4	_aDrug Industry _xeconomics
650	0	4	_aDrug-Related Side Effects and Adverse Reactions
650	0	4	_aEpidemiologic Factors
650	0	4	_aFinancial Support
650	0	4	_aFormularies as Topic
650	0	4	_aGovernment Regulation
650	0	4	_aHumans
650	0	4	_aInformation Services
650	0	4	_aInsurance Coverage
650	0	4	_aInsurance, Pharmaceutical Services
650	0	4	_aMotivation
650	0	4	_aOrganizational Policy
650	0	4	_aOutcome and Process Assessment, Health Care
650	0	4	_aPatient Selection
650	0	4	_aPractice Patterns, Physicians'
650	0	4	_aPrivate Sector
650	0	4	_aProduct Surveillance, Postmarketing
650	0	4	_aPublic Sector
650	0	4	_aPublication Bias
650	0	4	_aQuality Control
650	0	4	_aRacial Groups
650	0	4	_aResearch Design
650	0	4	_aSeverity of Illness Index
650	0	4	_aTime Factors
650	0	4	_aUnited States
650	0	4	_aUnited States Food and Drug Administration
773	0		_tSeton Hall law review _gvol. 37 _gno. 4 _gp. 969-1049
999			_c17863752 _d17863752